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If one set out to design a democracy in which the personal qualities of the top leader could be expected
to have an impact on political outcomes, the result might well resemble the political system of the United
States. The separation of powers and the Constitutional provision for a president with autonomous pow-
ers such as the veto have enabled chief executives to place a personal stamp on the nation's policies since
the founding of the Republic; but until the1930s, Congress typically took the lead in policy making, and
the activities of the federal government had little impact on the nation and world.
There then arose what has come to be called the modern presidency. Under the stimulus of the admin-
istrative imperatives of the New Deal and World War II, and the entrepreneurial leadership of Franklin
D. Roosevelt, there was a dramatic increase in the scope and influence of the federal government and,
therefore, its chief executive. The president’s capacity to make a difference was further magnified by the
emergence of the United States as a world power with a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile,
presidents began increasingly to make policy independent of the legislature, drawing on their sweeping
administrative powers, and the Executive Office of the President was created, providing chief executives
with the organizational support needed to carry out their expanded obligations.
The question of who occupies the Oval Office is most critical in decisions of war and peace, a domain in
which the president has the status of commander in chief. There is no more telling illustration of why
the person of the president matters than the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. In that month,
President John F. Kennedy and his associates learned that the Soviet Union was secretly installing in
Cuba a complex of ballistic missiles capable of obliterating much of the United States. This situation,
Kennedy concluded, could not be allowed to stand. His advisors were split between those who favored
finding a nonviolent means of inducing the Soviets to withdraw their missiles and those who called for
an immediate air strike on the missile sites, a course of action that we now know would likely have trig-
gered a devastating nuclear exchange. The buck stopped with JFK, who decided on the more cautious
option, even privately acceding to a Soviet demand that the United States withdraw its missiles from
Turkey in exchange for the removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba.
The American president, despite his (and someday, her) life-or-death power in international affairs, is far
from all-powerful. Presidents are constrained by other forces in the society and political system. Of the
presidents since World War II, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H. W. Bush were defeated at the
polls, Harry S Truman and Lyndon B. Johnson chose not to seek re-election at times when they were
deeply unpopular, Richard M. Nixon resigned, and Kennedy was assassinated. Moreover, even popular
chief executives are sometimes blocked or forced to modify their goals by the other powers-that-be in the
political system, especially in the domestic sphere. Nevertheless, the personal qualities of the individual
who happens to be president at particular points in American history can have as great an impact as the
impersonal forces and structures that command the bulk of attention in the scholarly literature on
American government.
QUALIT IES THAT SHAPE PRESIDENTIAL  PERFORMANCE
How can the concerned citizen assess the quality of a president’s job performance? There are two broad
ways of doing so. First is asking whether and to what extent the president’s policies comport with the cit-
izen’s own values and convictions. In this fundamentally personal realm, the specialized knowledge of
the presidential scholar has little to contribute, although valuable insight can be derived from the study
of ethics and political philosophy. Second is evaluating the strengths and weaknesses a president brings
to his responsibilities. Here the presidential specialist can make a contribution. 
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In the following paper, I examine the president’s performance in terms of six qualities that bear on the
job of the chief executive.1 The first relates to what might be thought of as the outer face of the presiden-
tial leadership: the president’s ability as a public communicator. The second pertains to its inner face: the
president’s organizational capacity. The third and fourth apply to the president as a political operator: his
political skill and the degree to which it is harnessed to a workable policy vision. The fifth and sixth bear
on the cognitive style with which the president processes the torrent of communications directed to him
and the president’s emotional intelligence: the matter of whether he is the master of his emotions rather
than permitting them to intrude into his conduct in office (Goleman, 1995). 
Effectiveness as a public communicator
The technology of contemporary mass communication makes the president a constant presence in the
nation and world, but for an office that places a premium on the bully pulpit, the presidency has been
surprisingly lacking in accomplished public communicators. The most conspicuous exceptions are
Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan. Other presidents who were less consistently
effective in their public communications sometimes hit rhetorical home runs: for example, George W.
Bush in the immediate in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Bill Clinton
when he was at his most effective. 
Chief executives who are daunted by the eloquence of Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Reagan should be relieved
to learn that their rhetorical powers were arrived at it by dint of experience and effort—they were not
inborn. When FDR was a political novice, his wife Eleanor heard him give a speech and was taken aback
by his long pauses and slow delivery. “I was worried for fear that he would never go on,” she recalled
(Roosevelt, 1937, 167). When the 29-year-old Kennedy entered the House of Representatives, he was a
soft-spoken, halting public speaker; his rhetorical panache evolved in the course of years of collaboration
with his speechwriter and alter ego, Theodore Sorensen. Despite Reagan’s extensive experience as a radio
announcer and movie actor, he did not perfect the polished podium manner of his political years until
the 1950s, when he spent much of the decade on the public speaking circuit as a representative of the
General Electric Corporation (Roosevelt, 1937; Silvestri, 2000; Cannon, 1982).
Organizational capacity
A president’s proficiency as an organizer of his administration includes his ability to select well-qualified
aides and mold them into an effective team. It also includes his capacity to devise organizational
procedures that insure him a rich flow of advice and information while minimizing the tendency of sub-
ordinates to tell their boss what they sense he wants to hear. FDR sought to foster diversity in the rec-
ommendations that reached him by pitting his assistants against each other. Kennedy charged his brother
Robert with scrutinizing the proposals of his other advisers for potential pitfalls.
Political skill
The notion that a political leader needs to be skilled might seem too obvious to remark on were it not
that the American political system places exceptional political demands on its chief executive. The
Constitution, which was framed in the eighteenth century with a view to making it difficult for the
government to act, remains in force in an era in which the government is called upon to take on innu-
merable politically demanding initiatives. If there was ever a need to demonstrate the importance of a
president’s political skill, it was put to rest by the difficulties encountered by Jimmy Carter, who was
impressively effective in pursuing the presidency but was reluctant to engage in political give-and-take
once in the White House. As a result, he had limited success in winning the support of other key politi-
cal actors, particularly the legislators whose backing he needed to advance his ambitious program.
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Lyndon Johnson, by way of contrast, was one of the most masterful politicians in the nation’s history.
Within hours after Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson had begun to muster support for major policy depar-
tures, including the first civil rights bill since Reconstruction to have enforcement provisions. However,
Johnson embarked on an open-ended U.S. military intervention in Vietnam in 1965, without establishing
its probable duration, troop requirements, and political feasibility, using his skill to downplay the magni-
tude of the war in order not to impede the enactment of his domestic program. By 1968, a half-million
American troops were enmeshed in Southeast Asia, and the nation was wracked with anti-war protest. In
the absence of a viable policy, Johnson’s political prowess proved to be counterproductive.2 This brings us
to the matter of what ends a president’s skill is directed—his policy vision.
Policy vision
When we say that a president exhibits vision, we may be pointing
to his use of rhetoric that stirs the imagination and evokes
intense feeling. For present purposes, however, I employ the
term to address the less lofty matter of whether and to what
extent a president’s actions are grounded in explicitly enunciated
policies, particularly those that accomplish the president’s goals.
The presidents whose actions were most clearly guided by an
overarching set of objectives were Dwight Eisenhower, Richard
Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush. The absence of a
sense of direction can lead a president to drift from one policy to
another, but a defective policy vision can lead him to take actions
that are ineffective or have undesirable consequences.
Cognitive style
Presidents vary in their intellectual endowments. Jimmy Carter had an engineer's proclivity to reduce
issues to their component parts, a mind-set that failed to provide his administration with an overall sense
of direction. Such a narrow cognitive style is in contrast to a broader, more strategic intelligence that cuts
to the heart of problems and identifies their policy implications. Richard Nixon provides a noteworthy
illustration of strategic intelligence. Two years before becoming president, Nixon published an article in
which he called for ending the American military involvement in Vietnam, establishing an amicable rela-
tionship with the People’s Republic of China, stabilizing U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. In addi-
tion, he implied that the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam was out of proportion to the American
stake in the situation in South East Asia (Nixon, 1967). By the final year of his first term, Nixon had
presided over an opening to China, secured an accommodation with the Soviet Union, and ended the
U.S. combat role in Vietnam.
Emotional intelligence
Just as Richard Nixon is a positive model in the realm of strategic intelligence, he is a distinctly negative
exemplar as far as emotional intelligence is concerned. Nixon’s emotional flaws negated his impressive
strengths. During the same four years in which he made his international breakthroughs, Nixon
embarked on what one of his aides referred to as the “Watergate horrors”—the covert campaign of espi-
onage and sabotage against his perceived enemies that had fatal consequences for his presidency. 
No chief executive has excelled in every one of these capacities. Strength in one may compensate for
weakness in another, however. Thus JFK presided over a rather disorganized White House, but his
actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis were clear-headed and wise. Jimmy Carter was almost willfully resist-
ant to political give-and-take, but he was pragmatic and deft in brokering a peace agreement between
“The absence of a sense of direction
can lead a president to drift 
from one policy to another, but a
defective policy vision can lead
him to take actions that are
ineffective or have undesirable
consequences.”
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Israel and Egypt. George H. W. Bush was deficient in what he deprecated as “the vision thing,” but he
was highly effective in the diplomatic prelude to the 1991 Gulf War. There is, however, one presidential
quality that should be indispensable: emotional intelligence. There can be few more profound risks in the
nuclear age than an emotionally challenged commander in chief, particularly one with hostile impulses
and defective impulse control.
GEORGE W.  BUSH AND THE POLIT ICS OF  PREEMPTION
In order to put flesh on the bones of this formulation, I now turn to the case of the current chief execu-
tive: George W. Bush. 
The American presidency is said to be an office in which some incumbents grow and others merely swell
up. If ever there was a chief executive to whom the first applies it is George W. Bush. Arriving in the
White House with only modest governmental experience, Bush took a minimalist approach to his respon-
sibilities before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Rising to the challenge, he went on to preside
over the nation with far greater authority and assertiveness. Bush has gone to great lengths to put his
stamp on national and international policy, but in doing so has advanced policies that have been
intensely controversial in the United States and abroad.
Before the presidency
George W. Bush was born on July 6, 1946, in New Haven, Connecticut, where his war veteran father,
George H. W. Bush, was a Yale undergraduate. In contrast to his father, who moved to Texas as an adult
but retained the outward signs of a New England transplant, the younger Bush is very much a product of
the Lone Star State. Whereas the elder Bush attended a private day school in Greenwich, Connecticut, his
son went to public school in Midland, Texas, where oil is the dominant economic force and the ambience
is that of tract houses, little league baseball, and easy informality. After elementary school, Bush followed
in his father’s path by attending the exclusive Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, and Yale, but
he was more conspicuous for his social skills than his classroom performance, retaining the brash
demeanor of a stereotypical Texan. 
Although Bush’s pre-presidential governmental service consisted only of six years as governor of Texas,
he was no political Johnny-come-lately. His paternal grandfather served in the Senate, and his father had
a long and varied political career, including two campaigns for the Senate, two terms in the House, eight
years as vice president, and four years as president. The younger Bush participated in his father’s many
election campaigns, managed the campaigns of two GOP Senate candidates, and ran a strong race for
Congress himself in his home district.
Two aspects of Bush’s pre-presidential years are significant for his presidential leadership. One relates to
his personal comportment and spiritual life. For many years Bush stood out as the under-achieving son
of a super-achieving father. Whereas George H.W. Bush had been a war hero, a self-made millionaire, and
the holder of a succession of high-profile political positions, the young George W. Bush was a heavy
drinker with a devil-may-care life style. In early middle age, however, his life came together. He married
the level-headed librarian Laura Welch, became the father of twin girls, experienced a spiritual awaken-
ing, and became a regular reader of the Bible. On the morning of his fortieth birthday, he awoke with an
intense hangover and swore off alcohol, anchoring his resolve in his Christian faith. 
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The other is his career as a CEO and his business-oriented conservative ethos. After completing college and
fulfilling his military obligation in the Texas Air National Guard, Bush attended Harvard Business School,
graduating with an MBA. He then returned to Texas and founded an oil exploration company. When oil
prices plunged in the 1980s, the company foundered, but the tax laws of the time enabled Bush to sell it
at a substantial profit. He then became the managing partner of the Texas Rangers, a major league base-
ball team. In the course of traveling the state to promote the team and appearing on television during its
games, Bush became highly visible, was able to win the Texas
Republican gubernatorial nomination, and go on to defeat the state’s
popular Democratic governor.
Both facets of Bush’s experience were manifested in the formula he
invoked to justify his gubernatorial and presidential programs: “com-
passionate conservatism.” By that phrase he meant to suggest that he
was hard-headed, but not hard-hearted: that he favored not only such
traditional conservative policies as major tax cuts, but also reforms
such as a measure using achievement testing to gauge the success of
schools attended by disadvantaged children, seeking to improve the
effectiveness of those that are performing poorly.
Bush ran for governor on a small number of explicitly stated issues: education and welfare reform, stiffer
penalties for juvenile offenders, and limitations on the right to litigate against businesses. He campaigned
vigorously, stayed on message, and won with 53 percent of the vote. By the end of the first legislative ses-
sion, all four measures had been enacted, and in 1998, he was reelected with a resounding 69 percent of
the two-party vote. 
This success and his name recognition made Bush the front-runner for the 2000 Republican presiden-
tial nomination, which he secured despite being defeated in the New Hampshire primary by Arizona
Senator John McCain. By March, Bush had won enough delegate support to be sure of the nomination.
In the same month, Vice President Al Gore locked in the Democratic nomination. In his presidential
campaign, Bush again focused on a handful of clearly delineated issue, including tax reduction; reforms
in education, health care, and Social Security; and an initiative designed to channel federal welfare funds
through the church-sponsored organizations that deliver much of the charity that reaches high-poverty
areas. Nothing in his campaign presaged his administration’s military involvements in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Indeed, he declared his opposition to a globally expansive foreign policy. 
The 2000 election could scarcely have been closer or more controversial. There was a near tie in the pop-
ular vote, with a slight edge for Gore. The all-important electoral vote outcome array on the state of
Florida, where the voters were evenly divided and there was a bewildering number of controversies about
the adequacy of the vote count. After a thirty-six day impasse, the United States Supreme Court issued a
ruling that made Bush the winner.
Bush as president 
From its very first day, the Bush presidency was off to a less than impressive start. As he took the oath of
office, Bush seemed composed and unperturbed by the controversy that attended his election, but he read
his inaugural address in a rote and plodding manner, pausing in mid-sentence and stumbling over words.
Bush’s halting presentation set the tone for his early addresses. He was more fluent on unscripted occa-
sions, but there was a potential problem when he spoke without a text. His lack of national experience,
placed him at risk of making an error, as when he remarked to an interviewer that the United States was
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“Bush made his single most 
important personnel choice
before he won the nomination,
when he selected a highly
experienced running mate in
the person of Dick Cheney.”
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committed to do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan from attack by the People’s Republic of China. In
fact, it was a longstanding American policy to be deliberately vague about how the nation would respond
to such a contingency, and Bush had not intended to signal a policy departure. Still another problem with
Bush’s early public communications was their infrequency. He never addressed the nation from the Oval
Office until the night of September 11, 2001. He never convened a major prime-time press conference
until a month after that date. And he rarely addressed the nation in his capacity as its symbolic leader. 
Despite Bush’s shortcomings as a public communicator and his imperfect command of policy specifics,
his early leadership was marked by successes in two realms, those of staffing his presidency and promoting
his policies. Bush made his single most important personnel choice before he won the nomination, when
he selected a highly experienced running mate in the person of Dick Cheney. With Cheney as a source of
advice, Bush went on to name an experienced cabinet and White House staff, not waiting for the resolu-
tion of the Florida electoral dispute to make preparations for taking office. 
Bush’s appointees included many veterans of the Nixon, Ford, Reagan and first Bush presidencies, as well
two of his own longtime Texas aides, communications advisor Karen Hughes and political strategist Karl
Rove. Bush’s national security team was particularly well seasoned: Secretary of State Colin Powell had
been chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and national security advisor, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld had previously held the same position, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice had
been a member of his father’s NSC staff.
One of Bush’s early legislative successes, his educational reform measure, was very much a bipartisan
effort. In his early weeks in office, Bush had put great effort into wooing the Senate’s leading liberal
Democrat, Edward Kennedy, who helped draft a bill that commanded broad-based support. But biparti-
sanship was not the norm. Instead, the pattern was set by the way the administration won the enactment
of its tax cut, relying almost exclusively on the narrow Republican Congressional majority and a handful
of Democratic defectors.
As of the first week of September, even many of Bush’s supporters would have agreed with the earlier
assertion of the Washington Post’s David Broder that the new president had not provided the American
people with a “clear definition” of himself (Broder, 2001). Indeed, when the Gallup organization fielded
a presidential support poll that week, it found that public approval of the new president was at its lowest
level of seven months of his presidency—51 percent.
Bush was visiting a Florida elementary school to promote his education bill on the morning of September
11 when he learned that the nation was under attack. Before leaving the school, he read a statement declar-
ing that “terrorism against our nation will not stand.” Because of concern that he would be targeted by
terrorists, Bush was flown to the control center of the Strategic Air Command in Nebraska, where he
presided by electronic means over a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC). At the meeting, the
director of the Central Intelligence Agency reported that the attacks were almost certainly the work of al
Qaeda, an Afghanistan-based terrorist organization that had been behind other acts of terrorism direct-
ed at the United States. Bush then returned to the White House, where he addressed the nation from the
Oval Office, asserting that the attacks were “acts of war,” that there “would be a monumental struggle
between good and evil” in which good would prevail, and that the United States would “make no dis-
tinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”
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In the chaotic first day of the episode, Bush came across as less than completely self-assured. He then
underwent a transformation. On September 14, he delivered a moving tribute to the victims of the ter-
rorist attacks in Washington and flew to New York City, where he inspected the wreckage of the World
Trade Center and addressed the rescue workers. When they shouted that they could not hear him, he
replied, “I can hear you. The rest of the world hears you, and the people who knocked these buildings
down will hear all of us soon!” In the weeks that followed, he became a compelling public presence. On
September 20, he made a forceful presentation to Congress in which he gave the regime in Afghanistan
an ultimatum to turn the al Qaeda leadership over to the United States and close down its terrorist camps.
Three weeks later, he delivered a highly effective address to the United Nations. Most impressive was his
October 11 prime-time news conference in the East Room of the White House. Responding in depth to
questions, Bush radiated a sense of composure and made evident his detailed mastery of what his admin-
istration’s anti-terrorism policies.
Just as Bush’s conduct of his responsibilities improved dramatically, the public’s ratings of his perform-
ance surged to 90 percent, the record high in Gallup presidential approval ratings. Members of the polit-
ical community also formed markedly more positive views of Bush’s leadership qualities. Even many of
his critics concluded that he had been underestimated, a view that extended to other nations. On October
20, for example, a columnist for the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine commented that Bush had grown
into his job “before our eyes,” comparing him to another president who rose to the demands of his times
following an unpromising start, Harry S Truman (Weiland, 2001).
In early October, the Afghan regime let it be known that it would not surrender the al Qaeda leadership,
and the United States and its ally Great Britain began an intensive bombing campaign. Later in the
month, U.S. Special Forces entered Afghanistan and began to provide military support to the anti-Taliban
Northern Alliance. By November 13, the Northern Alliance had occupied the Afghan capital of Kabul, and
in early December, the last major Taliban stronghold surrendered. When the Gallup organization polled
the public at the end of December, Bush’s approval level was 86 percent.
Bush had postponed a decision on whether to target Iraq in the War on Terror in a September NSC meeting
in which Defense Secretary Rumsfeld raised that possibility, but Iraq came into his cross-hairs in his January
2002 State of the Union Address. Anticipating the doctrine of preemption that his administration would for-
mally promulgate later in the year, Bush declared that he would not “wait on events” while “the world’s most
dangerous weapons” were acquired by “the world’s most dangerous regimes.” One such regime, he specified,
was Iraq, which he grouped with Iran and North Korea in what he described as an “axis of evil.” 
Bush’s speech sent out shock waves. Whereas his response to September 11 had been favorably received,
there was widespread criticism at home and abroad of his “axis of evil” locution. Some of it was prompt-
ed by a belief that Bush had lumped together nations that were very different in terms of whether and to
what extent they posed threats; some was directed at the usage “evil,” which led critics to worry about
whether the president’s intense personal commitment to evangelical Christianity was leading him to
advance an inappropriately moralistic foreign policy. 
Bush’s address presaged a preoccupation of the remainder of his first term that continued into his second
term: his efforts to come to terms with Iraq. Bush’s reference to Iraq in his 2002 State of the Union address
was the prelude to a procession of actions directed at Saddam Hussein’s regime. Diplomacy prevailed in
the fall of 2002, when the administration persuaded the United Nations Security Council to enact a reso-
lution insisting that Iraq destroy any weapons of mass destruction it might have and admit United Nations
inspectors to establish that it had done so. Early the following year, the administration turned to military
action, attempting without success to persuade the Security Council to authorize the use of force on the
grounds that Iraq had failed to comply with the UN demand. Then, in the face of substantial opposition at
home and abroad, it launched an invasion of Iraq, proceeding with Great Britain as its principal ally. 
The assault on Iraq began on March 20, American troops took control of Baghdad on April 6, and Bush
announced the end of “major combat operations” on May 2; but the situation on the ground remained
unsettled well into Bush’s second term. As American troop losses mounted, increasing numbers of
Americans expressed doubt about whether it had been wise for the United States to intervene in Iraq, and
Bush’s approval level sank dangerously low for a president seeking re-election. Seemingly unfazed, Bush
fought a vigorous campaign against the 2004 Democratic nominee, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry.
Despite last minute polls that projected Kerry as the winner, Bush won by 34 electoral votes. His popular
vote edge over Kerry was 2.5 percent, the smallest margin for a sitting president in the nation’s history.
He nevertheless declared the election to have been a mandate and went on to propose a highly ambitious
program for a second term chief executive.
Bottom line
Early in his presidency Bush seemed not to recognize the importance of presidential public communica-
tion. Following 9/11, however, he began to address the public regularly, forcefully, and often eloquently.
He was not uniformly effective thereafter, but when he rehearsed he was effective in his public addresses,
and he developed a punch, personable stump style that served him well in the 2004 campaign. On
January 20, 2005, he delivered his second-term inaugural address with fluency and confidence. The con-
trast to his inaugural remarks four years earlier was conspicuous.
Organizational capacity is one the strengths of the nation’s first MBA president. Bush has chosen strong
associates. He also excels at rallying his subordinates. Because avoiding public disagreement is a watch-
word of his presidency, its internal dynamics are not well documented, but clues are provided by Bob
Woodward’s reconstructions of the Bush administration’s military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Woodward’s accounts suggest that in some instances Bush’s deliberative processes leave something to be
desired. He reports, for example, that Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
expressed their differences more sharply in meetings that Bush did not attend than ones in which he was
present, suggesting that he may sometimes be shielded from potentially valuable debate. Woodward also
describes an instance in which Powell met privately with Bush and national security advisor Rice in
order to register his disagreement with the hawkish proposals of Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney
(Woodward, 2002, 177, 332-334; 2004). When subordinates make end runs around their colleagues, the
advice the president gets may be more a function of their bureaucratic skill than the merit of their 
recommendations. 
The congenitally gregarious George W. Bush resembles his fellow Texan Lyndon Johnson in his political
skill. As he did in Texas, Bush sometimes has worked effectively on both sides of the aisle. However, there
has been a hard edge to his leadership as president that was not evident in Texas It was evident interna-
tionally as well as domestically, most notably in the lead-up to the Iraq war, when his administration failed
to make a persuasive case for the urgency of immediate military action and went to war in the face of the
opposition of a number of the nation’s traditional allies.
Late-night television comedy notwithstanding, Bush has ample native intelligence. He has a cognitive style
that seems not to be marked by intellectual curiosity, however, and shows little interest in the play of
ideas. Moreover, he favors a corporate leadership model in which he relies on his subordinates to struc-
ture his options. After September 11, however, there was a dramatic increase in his mastery of the con- 227
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tent of his administration’s policies. As a member of Congress who is in regular contact with Bush put
it, “He’s as smart as he wants to be” (Thomma, 2001).
What is critical for a president’s emotional intelligence is that his public actions not be distorted by uncon-
trolled passions. He need not be a paragon of mental health in his private life. By this litmus test, the
heavy-drinking, young George W. Bush was too volatile to be a promising prospect for a responsible pub-
lic position. It would not be surprising if a man who abused alcohol until early middle age proved to be
an emotional tinder box, but Bush’s performance as a private sector executive and governor of Texas was
not marred by emotional excesses. He weathered the 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns with equa-
nimity, and whatever the merits of his administration’s military ventures, there is no sign that they were
the result of out-of-control emotions.
The topic of policy vision suggests an unlikely parallel between George
W. Bush and George H. W. Bush. The first President Bush was famous-
ly indifferent to “the vision thing.” The second President Bush has
faulted his father for failing to enunciate clear goals for his presidency
and to rack up domestic accomplishments on which to campaign for re-
election. George W. Bush goes out of his way to evince a policy vision.
He holds that if a president does not set his own goals, others will set them for him. However, if his vision
that the regime of Saddam Hussein needed to be removed and Iraq proves to be a quagmire, Bush’s second
term may falter. His presidency may suffer from having a vision, just as his father’s suffered for lacking one.
CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS ON PRESIDENTIAL  LEADERSHIP:  THE T IMES AND
THE PUBLIC
As the preceding case illustrates, the capacity of the president to make a difference is a function not only
of his personal attributes, but also the political environment in which they are brought to bear. A presi-
dent who is well suited to serve in one setting may be ill suited for another. The most celebrated modern
chief executive, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, had been a presence on the national political scene for two
decades before entering the White House. He had established himself as a talented politician and elo-
quent orator, but was viewed as something of a lightweight because he lacked a well-developed policy
vision. If FDR had served in an uneventful period, he might have left little in the way of a historical lega-
cy. As it happened, the circumstances of the Great Depression and World War II placed a premium on
Roosevelt’s inspirational and political gifts. In the absence of those contexts, it is possible that his presi-
dency would be of modest historical interest.
One contextual determinant of the president’s ability to make a difference is the extent of his public back-
ing. Congress was deferential to Roosevelt in the early months of his presidency in large part because its
members were convinced that he had overwhelming public support. In Roosevelt’s time, politicians
relied on personal impressions to assess the president’s public standing. During the Truman years, a
more reliable means of gauging presidential approval came into use: public opinion polls in which sta-
tistically representative cross-sections of the public are asked to evaluate the president’s handling of his
duties. Presidential approval polls have become a force in their own right. High levels of approval can be
much to the president’s advantage, and low public approval can be a prescription for failure.
The elected term of President Harry Truman provides an example of how a president can be hamstrung
by lack of public support. In 1948, Truman won election in his own right in a campaign in which he pro-228
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“A president who is well suited 
to serve in one setting may be 
ill suited for another.”
posed an ambitious domestic program, including a landmark civil rights proposal and universal health
insurance. Before the first year of his second term was over, however, his administration was the recipi-
ent of a pair of body blows. In September 1949, the Soviet Union was revealed to have developed nuclear
weapons. The next month, mainland China came under Communist control, fueling a venomous public
debate over whether the administration had “lost China” and was “soft on Communism.” 
On June 25, 1950, there was still another politically costly development. American- supported South
Korea was invaded by Communist North Korea, and Truman and his associates concluded that it would
be necessary to employ American troops to prevent a Communist takeover. The war evolved into a polit-
ically costly stalemate, in which the United States and its allies were arrayed against not only North Korea,
but also the almost limitless man power of Communist China. For the final two years of Truman’s pres-
idency, his approval level was in the 20 to 30 percent range, among the lowest in the modern presidency.
Not surprisingly, Congress showed no interest in enacting his program.
Public response to the president is conditioned by an important background consideration. In most
democracies, executive leadership is divided between a political leader, such as a prime minister, and a
head of state, such as a constitutional monarch or politically neutral president. In the United States, the
two roles are combined. As head of state, the president is expected to represent all Americans, but in his
political capacity he must engage in the divisive process of advancing his administration’s policies. Being
more than a mere political leader can enhance the president’s effectiveness by enabling him to tap the
intense loyalty Americans have for their nation.
The feelings bound up in the presidency are prominently displayed on the occasion of the death of a sit-
ting president. There were spontaneous displays of public grief and mourning following the assassina-
tion of Kennedy, the death by natural causes of FDR, and even the death of the lackluster Warren
Harding. A less grim manifestation of the public bond to the chief executive is the upsurge in presiden-
tial approval that commonly follows the outbreak of national crisis, an example being the spike in public
evaluations of George W. Bush after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The depth of emotion
invested in the chief executive helps account for the continuing interest in the matter to which I now turn,
presidential greatness.
A CODA ON PRESIDENTIAL  GREATNESS
The faces of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt were not
chiseled into Mount Rushmore because these men were thought to have been merely competent. They
were deemed to have been truly great. But how is greatness to be determined, and can it be ascertained
with any degree of objectivity? 
The changing assessments of Thomas Jefferson illustrate the uncertainty of such judgments. For much
of the 19th century, Jefferson was dismissed an impractical idealist whose vision of a nation of small
farmers was irrelevant to an age of urban growth and industrialization. In the Progressive Era and the
period of the New Deal, however, he acquired the status of a democratic icon. The Jefferson Memorial
was erected in the nation’s capital, and a five-cent coin bearing his portrait was issued. But by the final
decade of the twentieth century, Jefferson had gone into eclipse as attention shifted to his status as a slave
owner and the probable father of several slave children.3
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Should we conclude from such fluctuations that presidential greatness is merely in the eye of the behold-
er? There clearly is more to the story. Consider a pair of presidents whose reputations have remained tow-
ering despite changes in political climate: George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. At first glance the
two men seem poles apart. Washington was a Virginia aristocrat who comported himself with studied
dignity. Lincoln was born into rural poverty and his manner was droll and homespun. Yet they had two
things in common. They held office in periods of national peril and are widely viewed as having risen to
the challenge of their times. Washington’s challenge was to legitimize the new nation and set it on a firm
footing; Lincoln’s was to win the war that erupted just after he took office and restore the Union.
Washington brought his good sense and monumental prestige to bear in his efforts, and Lincoln presided
over the Civil War with shrewdness and tenacity, going on to seek reconciliation with the South. In both
cases their accomplishments were monumental.
There has been a continuing interest in rating and ranking American presidents. A recent volume enti-
tled The Uses and Abuses of Presidential Ratings lists the results of ten such efforts in the period from 1948
to 2000 (Bose & Landis, 2003). These typically are polls of historians and others who are deemed to be
authoritative, and most of them sort the chief executives from Washington into five categories, great, near
great, above average, average, below average and failure. The basis of the ratings is ordinarily left up to the
raters, leaving it up to them to decide whether to assess the way a president did his job or the merits of
his policies. Because the ratings are overall judgments, they fail to identify the mixed performance of a
president such as Richard Nixon, who had major foreign policy accomplishments but was forced to
resign over Watergate. Indeed, Nixon was judged to be a failure in six of the seven surveys in which
authorities on the presidency were asked to rate him and below average in the seventh.
In spite of the imperfect methodology of such studies, there is striking similarity in their findings. Every
study placed Washington and Lincoln in the great category. FDR was also consistently ranked as great,
even in a survey commissioned by the Wall Street Journal in 2000, which was designed to remedy the
alleged liberal bias in earlier studies. Other presidents who were deemed to be great or near great include
Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman, and Ronald
Reagan. Eisenhower registered the greatest change over the years, rising from average in 1962 to above
average or near great beginning in the 1980s, when scholarship based on the declassified record of his
presidency began to appear in print. (There is a standard list of failures, which, in addition to Nixon,
includes James Buchanan, Andrew Johnson, Ulysses S. Grant, and Warren G. Harding.) If there is a com-
mon denominator in presidential assessments it is a bias toward activism, unless the activism is viewed
as misplaced, as in the instances of Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam and Nixon and Watergate. 
There are pros and cons to the concern with presidential greatness. The presidents who have been viewed
as great provide the nation with unifying symbols, in much the manner of the flag and national anthem.
They also serve as role models and sources of lessons. The negative of such ratings is that they divert
attention from the full range of presidential experience. The reasons why presidents fail can be as instruc-
tive as the reason why they succeed. The performance of most presidents being mixed, it therefore pro-
vides both positive lessons and warnings.
Whatever the merits of the quest for presidential greatness, one thing is certain: The occupant of 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue deserves the closest of scrutiny. In the words of the old spiritual, “He has the whole
world in his hands.”
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Note
This paper has been adapted from a forthcoming chapter in Joel Aberbach & Mark Peterson (Eds.), Institutions of
American democracy: The Executive branch (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) by permission of Oxford University
Press and the Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands.
ENDNOTES
1 The most influential works on the impact of individual presidents are Neustadt (1960) and Barber (1972), both of
which have gone through later editions without a change in theme. The first emphasizes political skill and the sec-
ond emotional fitness. My own formulation, which combines and expands on those of Neustadt and Barber, is set
forth in Greenstein (2004).
2 On the American military intervention in Vietnam, see Burke & Greenstein (1989), 118-254. 
3 For reviews rankings of presidents, see Blessing & Murray (1994) and Bose & Landis (2003). For a reasoned effort
to identify a handful of great presidents, see Landy & Milkis (2000). Jefferson’s shifting reputation is discussed by
Bernstein (2003).
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